

**DIIS SEMINAR 4 February 2004:
*On the Concept of 'First In'***

”Like it or not, most of you will find yourselves in a place you never heard of, doing things you never wanted to do”

General John Shalikashvili, U.S. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, to soldiers on Post-Cold War duties

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***The Danish Armed Forces and their
Transformation to be able to make an
Immediate and Substantial Contribution to
Expeditionary Operations***

Background

- Ex Longterm Defence Planner
- 20 years of encouraging reforms
- 10 years observation from abroad
- 5 years exposure to NATO Force Planners' transformation pressure on CEE Countries
- The historian's deep scepticism when offered simple solutions

Assumptions in the presentation

- It deals only with expeditionary operations, not with Homeland Security
- It accepts Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation's observation in Oberammergau on 15th January this year that transformation must bring changes to doctrine, organisation, capabilities, training, education and logistics
- All operations take place within a multinational framework
- "Mission Creep" must be accepted as normal!

Assumptions in the presentation

- As a minimum a stable defence budget level (*otherwise the transformation cannot be supported, and Denmark will see a significant loss of just gained international respect and influence - as well as a continued high risk of unnecessary casualties caused by insufficient training and discipline*)
- A willingness by the politicians and the defence and service leadership to accept the necessary very painful steps in the fields of personnel reductions, closure of bases and professionalisation of regular and reserve employment contracts (*otherwise no real transformation*)

The Challenge

- The Danish Armed Forces must to be able to make an **Immediate** and **Substantial** Contribution to Expeditionary Operations everywhere in the world
 - From humanitarian relief **to** earthquakes and other disaster areas **via** post-war Kosovo-type and Afghanistan peace enforcement and stability operations **via** limited, high quality combat contributions like in Afghanistan **to** a substantial – politically effective and visible - contribution to intervention like Iraq (or the land operation that should have been prepared for Kosovo)

The Challenge

- The Danish Armed Forces must therefore to be able to make an **Immediate** and **Substantial** Contribution to Expeditionary Operations everywhere in the world
 - Including high-intensity operations
 - In difficult terrain (including mountains, cities and jungles) – those are the places where people live and conflicts need to be contained or managed
 - In demanding climatic conditions
 - In the new type of joint operational environment
 - Deploying and supporting itself
 - Interphasing with major allied countries' Command and Control system

The Challenge

- The forces must be able to adjust gradually as the operation changes from combat to stability to nation building operations
- Even when first in, the forces must be able to maintain a high quality presence a reasonable period (probably 1-2 years with changing composition)

Present structure

- Rich in half-empty barracks and bases – and therefore rich in civilian support personnel
- Rich in administrative headquarters – and therefore rich in civilian support personnel
- Rich in mobilisation force equipment and stores – and therefore rich in civilian support personnel
- Wasteful in the way it has deployed its service training branches and logistics in many locations
- Very low unit training and cohesion level dominated by civilian framework conditions

Present structure

- Regular personnel, both officers and other ranks, with a too high average age
- Too many officers have lost the basic understanding that remaining a professional takes continued studies
- The reserve contract system is built on hope rather than reality which means that the regular reserve personnel is not available for missions
- The part-time defence volunteers have not been harnessed to the main projects of the armed forces in a realistic and focused way
- No system or tradition of learning from other countries' "best-practice" armed forces

New structure

- Deliberate seeking of inspiration from other countries' armed forces
- Deep cut in number of bases, barracks and depots (and their support work-force) to free resources
- Cut in number of administrative headquarters
- Reduction in equipment and stores to the much lower level needed now
- Accompanying deep reduction in civilian support personnel
- Service training branches to be concentrated in one location each – e.g. in the army one for mechanised combat forces, one for light forces, one for fire support, etc.

New structure

- Large part of freed resources used to make branch unit, combined arms and joint training intense and realistic, thereby also enhancing unit cohesion
- Large part of freed resources used in the making possible a proper and humane departure of personnel no longer needed
- Large part of freed resources used for attracting and keeping suitable regular and reserve personnel
- Freed resources used for equipment investment, including compatible command and control systems

New structure

- "Toolbox"-organisation with a balanced mix (in the army of SOF, heavy combat, light combat, combat support and combat service support elements), with proper joint means for strategic, operational and tactical transport and control
- Integration of teams and subunits of part-time volunteers in the "toolbox"
- New cadre education and contract system emphasising professionalism og adaptability
- Maximum use of contracts with civilian companies to sustain and offer service support to long-duration missions